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Abstract
This paper contributes to the heated debate on the link between climate and civil war.
We exploit a large dataset of a drought index commonly used in hydrology, the Palmer
Drought Severity Index (PDSI). The PDSI is based on a hydrological model and is a cumu-
lative measure that takes account of past climatic variables. Our analysis takes account of
country fixed effects, removal of the most influential observations, use of alternative sam-
ple periods and changes to the battle-death threshold. Overall, results show a robust link
between drought and civil war in Sub-Saharan African states after independence.
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1 Introduction
Climate change will generate an increase in the number of abnormal climatic events, such as
droughts, floods and hurricanes (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). These
climatic anomalies might have disastrous consequences for countries with scarce fresh water
supply and economies that depends on local agriculture. Given that the poorest of African
households derive between 60% and 100% of their income from agricultural activities (Davis
et al., 2007) and often have no access to safe water,1 Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most
adversely climate change affected regions in the world. The civil war in Darfur is an ethnic
conflict between Arabs and Black Africans, but there is a consensus that drought (and deserti-
fication) is a contributory causes of this war because it increases disputes over arable land and
water (Stephan, 2009). Climate anomalies may increase competition for resources, and cause
tensions that escalate into civil war. In this paper, we exploit a large dataset from the Palmer
Drought Severity Index, a drought index used in hydrology, to show that drought has had a pos-
itive and robust effect on the incidence of civil war, in the period 1945-2005, in Sub-Saharan
African states following independence.
Our paper contributes to recent and heated debate on the link between climate and civil war.
The seminal paper by Miguel et al. (2004) refers to the Sub-Saharan African countries in the
period 1981-1999 and shows that positive rainfall variations decrease the likelihood of civil war
through their positive impact on GDP.2 Burke et al. (2009) focus on the direct link between
climate and civil war. They study a reduced form relationship between rainfall, temperature,
and civil war and show that higher temperatures increase the likelihood of civil war. Several
1Many African people have no secure access to freshwater. Only 22% of Ethiopians, 29% of Somalis and 42%
of Chadians have secure access to freshwater.
2Brückner (2010) uses a similar approach and shows that civil war is more likely to occur following an increase
in population.
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scholars have challenged the robustness of the link between rainfall/temperature and civil war;
their arguments fall into two categories.
The first set of arguments relates to the lack of robustness to changes in the data and/or in
the coding choices. Jensen and Gleditsch (2009) argue that the measure of conflict in Miguel
et al. (2004) is problematic and that estimates of the effect of growth on civil conflict should be
limited to conflict in a state territory. Along the lines of Fearon and Laitin (2003), they consider
that negative economic shocks will decrease the capacity of governments to send troops to fight
in civil wars in other states; however, Burke et al. (2010a) explain this mechanism as nega-
tive economic shocks making it easier to recruit fighters (because of their reduced opportunity
cost). Buhaug (2010) argues that the result is not robust to changes in the model specification
(fixed effects and trends), in the rainfall and precipitation measures, or changes in the battle
death threshold (which allows us distinguish between times of civil war and peace). Buhaug
et al. (2010) argue that the effect is not robust to removing few very influential problematic
observations, nor to alternative sample periods (within the 1960-2008 period).3
The second category of critique relates to the choice to model climate. Ciccone (2011)
argues that Miguel et al. (2004)’s finding rests on their choice of estimating the link between
rainfall variations and civil conflict. He claims that the result is driven by a positive correlation
between lagged rainfall levels and civil conflict. Ciccone (2011) uses the latest data and finds
no link between rainfall levels and civil conflict. Miguel and Satyanath (2011)’s response is that
if the focus is on the causal relationship between economic shocks and civil conflict, the use
of rainfall levels rather than rainfall variations does not affect their initial result. They provide
some theoretical arguments to explain why they think that rainfall variations are a better measure
3See also the argument in Burke et al. (2010a) and Burke et al. (2010b) on the relevance of Buhaug’s criticism.
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than rainfall levels.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we exploit a large dataset from the PDSI
(Palmer, 1965).4 The PDSI provides a better measurement of drought than precipitation or tem-
perature levels. The PDSI is based on a hydrological model and it is a cumulative measurement
which takes into account past climatic variables. Second, our database covers a longer time
period (1945-2005) than the studies in the literature which usually refer to the 1980s and the
1990s. Third, we find a positive and significant effect of drought on the incidence of civil war
in Sub-Saharan African states after their independence. This result is robust to changes in the
model specification (fixed effects and trends), to the removal of the most influential observa-
tions, to the use of alternative sample periods and to changes in the battle death threshold.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the PDSI data, the
control variables and our estimation framework. Section 3 presents our results regarding the
effect of drought on the incidence of civil war. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and estimation framework
2.1 Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI)
Measuring rainfall and temperature is not a sufficient measure of drought. For instance, the
temporal distribution of rainfall along the year and the accumulation capacity of the soil also
matter. Hydrologists and meteorologists do not rely on rainfall and/or temperature data alone to
measure drought. The PDSI is the most prominent meteorological index of drought. It takes into
account of local conditions and the local area’s climate history. PDSI values for two different
4This has not been widely exploited in economics (with the exception of Landon-Lane et al. (2009) for the
United States).
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countries with the same current temperature and rainfall levels may differ because of differences
in the local conditions (e.g. day length, soil characteristics). PDSI values also varies within the
same country although temperature and rainfall levels may be the same (at two different dates)
because the climate history is different.
The PDSI measures moisture differences from a climatological normal. It is based on a
supply and demand model of soil moisture and is calculated on precipitation and temperature
data as well as the local Available Water Content (AWC) of the soil. All the basic terms in the
water balance equation can be determined, including evapo-transpiration, soil recharge, runoff,
and moisture loss from the surface layer. The PDSI is a weighted cumulative sum of monthly
terms measured as differences from the monthly average, over the 1870-2005 period. This index
captures departures from average local climatic conditions.
PDSI data are a world time series available for 1870-2005, geolocalised and available at a
resolution of 2.5 degrees by 2.5 degrees. We use the scale [0,30] for the PDSI values: a value
of 15 refers to the “normal” climatic situation. As defined by Palmer, a PDSI value above 25,
indicates an “extremely dry” climate, while a PDSI value below 5 is an “extremely wet” climate.
To carry out our country-year level analysis, we aggregate the monthly geolocalised PDSI data
to compute the country-year average. The distribution of this variable for the Sub-Saharan
region for the period 1945-2005 is normal,5 the average value is 15.376, which is close to the
normal climatic situation and the standard deviation is 2.52, which is 16.4% of the average.
Figure 1 shows the density of the PDSI for the Sub-Saharan region for the period 1945-2005
and its evolution over the decades. The density curve moves to the right, i.e. the Sub-Saharan
climate has became dryer. The curve becomes flatter and more right skewed. In other words,
5According to the Chi square test.
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more and more countries’ climates are approaching “extreme dryness”.
Figure 1: PDSI Density
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2.2 Other Variables
We use the last version of the UCDP/PRIO civil war database (version 4-2009). We use the
dummy variable civil war incidence, which is equal to 1 for years with a number of deaths
greater than 1,000, and 0 otherwise (we discuss our results for alternative coding choices later).
The UCDP/PRIO database includes three categories of conflict: extrasystemic, internal and
internationalised armed conflict. These are defined as follows. An extrasystemic armed con-
flict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. Extrasystemic wars
include colonial wars and imperial wars. An internal armed conflict occurs between the gov-
ernment of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other
states. An internationalised internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state
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and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states. We use data
from the Correlates Of War (COW) to check the robustness of our results.
We also consider other determinants found in the literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004). GDP growth and Population data are from the World Bank. The Percent-
age of Mountainous Terrain, Oil, U.K. and French colony are from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Oil is a dummy that is 1 if a country’s fuel exports exceeds one-third of its export revenues.
Polity 2 are from the Polity IV project; its scale is the unit interval with the higher values indi-
cating stronger democratic institutions. U.K. Colony and French Colony are two time invariant
dummies for U.K. and French colonies.
2.3 Estimation Framework
The recent debate on the existence of a link between climate and civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa
uses country fixed effects and time trends. They serve as substitutes for variables suspected to
be endogenous (e.g. GDP), to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and to take account of
temporal trends in the causes of conflicts. In most of our estimates, we follow the literature and
use a reduced-form relationship which links civil war and drought:
Warit = β0 + β1Droughtit + Trendsit + αi + it, (1)
where i denotes the country and t denotes time. Warit is the incidence of civil war or onset
of the civil war. The civil war onset index is coded 1 for the first year of the civil war, 0
for each year of peace and set to missing from the second year to the last year of the civil
war. The incidence of civil war index, which is a subsume of civil war outbreak and civil war
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continuation, is a dummy variable which is 1 for years with a number of battle related deaths
greater than 1,000 and 0 otherwise (peace).
Droughtit is the PDSI and it is the error term. Most of our specifications include country
fixed effects (αi) and country specific time trends (Trendsit). The probit and logit procedures
exclude countries that have not experienced a civil war when country fixed effects are included
and this restricts our sample to 13 countries. Our database includes 37 countries (see Table 6 in
Appendix A) and we apply the least squares method to most of our estimates to retain the maxi-
mum number of observations. All reported standard errors are consistent for heteroskedasticity.
It is highly probable that least squares estimates of the error terms in equation 1 will present
time-series correlation within country observations. Bertrand et al. (2004) highlight that the
inclusion of country fixed effects is not enough to overcome this issue. The usual method is to
compute cluster-robust standard errors at country level as in Ciccone (2011). Ignoring clustering
leads to underestimation of the standard errors. However, in our case clustering introduces
another issue because our specification includes a larger number of exogenous variables (37
country dummies (fixed effects), 37 country specific time trends and the PDSI) than the number
of clusters (37). Cameron and Miller (2011) claim that it is not possible to perform a test of
overall significance of the regression when the number of exogenous variables is at least as high
as the number of clusters.6 This issue is as important as the issue of the bias induced by ignoring
clustering at country level. Therefore, when estimating cluster-robust standard errors we do not
include fixed effects and country specific time trends in the specification.
6It is not possible to test for overall significance of the regression if the rank of the cluster-robust estimate of
the variance-covariance matrix of the least squares estimator is not less than the number of clusters.
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3 Drought and Civil War Robustly Linked in Independent
Countries
3.1 Main results
We focus on the effect of drought on the incidence of civil war over the period 1945 to 2005.
The first column in Table 1 shows our estimates of equation (1) without country fixed effects
and trends. The dependent variable includes extrasystemic, internal and internationalised armed
conflict (as defined in the UCDP/PRIO civil war database). Drought and the civil war incidence
index are positively and significantly correlated, i.e. civil war occurs when and where the cli-
mate is dry during the 1945-2005 period. This result contrasts with the results in the litterature
obtained using rainfall and temperature data. Indeed, Buhaug (2010) finds no significant cor-
relation between temperature/rainfall and the incidence of civil war in the period 1981-2002
(the sensitivity of our result to the time window is discussed in section 3.2). As Buhaug (2010)
argues, the exogenous nature of the climate index and our conscious focus on the relatively ho-
mogenous Sub-Saharan Africa, might lead us to assume that the simple correlation is sufficient.
However, if there is a correlation this may be a statistical artefact and there may be no causal
link between drought and civil war due to omission of the variables representing the true un-
derlying forces. To overcome the potential bias induced by omission of independent variables,
we introduce country dummies and country specific time trends (column (2) in Table 1). The
positive link between drought and the incidence of civil war during 1945-2005 is no longer
significant.
The previous regressions were run for data including extrasystemic, internal and interna-
tionalised civil wars. We think that the non-significant effect shown in column (2) in Table 1
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may be due to the inclusion of extrasystemic civil war. Jensen and Gleditsch (2009) point out
that countries involved in civil wars in other states should not be included in the analysis.7 They
argue that according to Fearon and Laitin (2003), negative economic shocks should decrease the
capacity of governments to send troops to civil wars in other states. We think that this restriction
should be considered in the context of our analysis; thus, we run a third regression using the
specification in (1) with country fixed effects and trends. Column (3) presents our estimates
when extrasystemic civil wars are excluded. The results suggest that drought has no causal
effect on the incidence of civil war since the coefficient of the PDSI variable is not significant.
Table 1: Drought and Civil War Incidence: 1945 -2005
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
War (PRIO) All All Internal &
Internationalized
Drought (PDSI) 0.422** 0.301 0.230
(0.186) (0.201) (0.189)
Country Fixed Effect: No Yes Yes
Country Specific
Time Trends : No Yes Yes
Observations 2,257 2,257 2,257
R-squared 0.002 0.355 0.369
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respec-
tively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
OLS regressions
However, these results are not sufficient to exclude the possibility of a causal link between
drought and civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa. The history of Sub-Saharan Africa reveals that
there were important political changes throughout the 20th century. Many African countries
were colonized before World War II and decolonized after World War II. The process of decol-
onization and emergence of new states presents a theoretical and empirical challenge. It raises
7They show that the estimated effect of economic growth on civil war is reduced compared to Miguel et al.
(2004)’s.
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questions about the inclusion or exclusion of anticolonial civil wars in the analysis (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) propose two ways to include anticolonial civil wars.
The first corresponds to the way the data we used in our estimates shown in Table 1 are coded.
The data are coded such that Ivory Coast is a single "state" for the whole 1945-2005 period
(in fact it was part of the French empire from 1895 to independence in 1960). In other words,
we consider “states” that did not exist (such as “Ivory Coast” from 1945 to 1960). This coding
strategy also ignores the existence of colonial empires, but note that this is a potential reason for
the non significant effect of the estimates in columns 2 and 3 in Table 1. Indeed, the significance
of drought may be strongly reduced because a coloniser may compensate for its adverse effects.
The second strategy is to consider colonial empires. For instance, Ivory Coast and Cameroon
are categorized as belonging to the French empire before they gained independence (in 1960).
Considering colonial empires requires the construction of explanatory variables for whole em-
pires. Fearon and Latin conclude that, although possible, it would be very problematic to code
variables such as GDP, ethnic fractionalization and democracy score. Also, in our context it
makes little sense to assign a climate value to a whole colonial empire. For instance, it would
be meaningless to assign the PDSI value of the French metropole (coloniser) to French colonies
(such as Ivory Coast and Cameroon), or to assign the value of the PDSI averaged over the whole
French empire to French colonies.
We choose then to focus on civil wars in independent African states and to exclude the colo-
nial period. The time frame we consider is the period from a country’s independence to the most
recent year in our data, 2005. For example, the time frame for Ghana starts in 1957, Mozam-
bique and Angola in 1975, and the former French colonies in 1960. Table 2 shows the estimates
of the specification in equation (1) restricting the sample to independent countries. Column (1)
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in Table 2 shows the estimates with the dependant variable that includes both internationalised
and internal civil wars (country fixed effects and country time trends are included).8 The effect
of drought on civil war is positive and significant.
We can distinguish between internationalised civil wars and internal civil wars because they
are different (in internationalised civil wars the underlying cause of the continuation of war may
depend on the intervener). We find that drought has no effect on the incidence of internation-
alised civil wars (column (2) in Table 2). We suspect that there is no effect because we do not
control for the characteristics of the intervener. However, we do not pursue this direction since
analysis of interventions is outside the scope of the present paper. We choose instead to focus
on internal civil wars.
We find that drought (PDSI) has a positive effect on the incidence of internal civil wars.
Column (3) in Table 2 represents our preferred specification (124 observations withWarit = 1).
In columns (4) and (5) we add the lagged civil war incidence variable as the probability that civil
war depends on whether there was a war in the previous year. Column (4) reports least squares
estimates and column (5) reports system-General Method of Moment (GMM) estimates of this
dynamic equation.9 As the Sub-Saharan countries have some common trends, such as economic
development and democratization, we include a common time trend (across countries). The
effect of drought is still positive and significant (see column (6) in Table 2). Thus, the results
in Table 2 show a robust effect of drought on civil war in the Sub-Saharan countries after
independence.
8Includes 128 observations of civil war.
9The least squares estimator is inconsistent for a finite time-series dimension; the system-GMM is consistent as
the cross-sectional dimension goes toward infinity even when the number of years is finite, see Wooldridge (2002),
page 304 or Greene (2002), page 308.
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Table 2: Drought and Civil War Incidence: After independence
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War Internal & Internationalized Internal Internal Internal Internal
Internationalized
Drought (PDSI) 0.719*** -0.0328 0.669*** 0.352* 0.460* 0.371*
(0.264) (0.138) (0.246) (0.188) (0.254) (0.223)
Lag Incidence 0.560*** 0.568***
(0.0584) (0.0216)
Country Fixed Effect: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Time
Trends : Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Common Time Trends: - - - - - Yes
Observations 1,597 1,597 1,597 1,594 1,594 1,597
R-squared 0.445 0.433 0.321 0.533 - 0.278
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Column (1) to (4) and (6) using OLS. The method of estimation is system-GMM for column (5).
3.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we show that our results are robust and pass several sensitivity tests. One of the
arguments used against the result in Miguel et al. (2004)’s seminal work is that the link between
rainfall and civil war fails to pass several sensitivity tests (see Buhaug (2010)). We show that
our results are much less sensitive.
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to a change in the time frame of the sample con-
sidered. The processes of democratization and the development of Sub-Saharan Africa might
have induced changes in the relationship between drought and civil war during the post-World
War II period. Thus, the effect of drought on civil war may be sensitive to the time frame in our
sample. We use our preferred specification (in column (3) in Table 2) and re-estimate the effect
of drought on civil war for all possible time intervals of a minimum of 20 consecutive years
(i.e. 861 estimates). The graph at the top of Figure 2 represents the size of the coefficient of the
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PDSI (β̂1) for every possible start and end years in the timescale. We choose the value of the
estimated coefficient of the PDSI in our preferred specification (0.67) as a reference (column
(3) in Table 2). The values are classified into three sets: the first contains negative values (pale
grey), the second contains values between 0 and 0.67 (grey) and the third contains values above
0.67 (dark). In most cases, the value of the estimated coefficient of the PDSI is larger than 0.67.
The graph at the bottom of Figure 2 represents the degree of significance of the estimated coeffi-
cient of the PDSI (whether significant at the 10% level of confidence or not). The coefficient of
drought is almost always positive, significant, and higher than 0.67 when the timescale consid-
ered ends after the beginning of the 1980s and is smaller and non significant when the timescale
ends earlier. This result may be due to the small number of ongoing civil wars before the 1980
(28 observations with Warit = 1) and by the frequency of “normal” climatic situations (see
Figure 1). Our result is very robust to a change in the time frame, compared to estimates that
use rainfall and temperature data (see the discussion of Buhaug et al. (2010) on Burke et al.
(2010a)).
We test the robustness of our result to the exclusion of the most influential observations.10
Our preferred estimates (column (3) in Table 2) run over 1,597 observations, 124 of which are
observations with civil war. Thus, the results may be very sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion
of a small number of observations. We use the dfbeta statistic for the PDSI to identify obser-
vations that are likely to exercise an overly large influence. We use our preferred specification
(column (3) in Table 2). The critical value is 2/
√
n, where n is the number of observations.
We find a threshold that amounts to .05 and identify 74 observations with higher dfbeta values.
When these observations are excluded, the estimated coefficient of the PDSI is lower and less
10Buhaug et al. (2010) argue that the estimates in Burke et al. (2010a) regarding temperature data do not pass
this test.
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Figure 2: Drought Effect with Different Time Frame
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significant; however, it remains significant at the 10% level. This confirms the robustness of the
effect of drought for the post colonial period (see Table 5 in Appendix A).
We now test whether our results are sensitive to a change in the battle-related deaths thresh-
old. There is an usual distinction in the litterature, between civil war and civil conflict, according
to the number of battle-related deaths (the focus in this paper is on civil war years, e.g. when
the number of battle related deaths per year is larger than 1,000). We re-code our dependent
variable Warit for each threshold between 25 and 200,000 battle-related deaths per year and
re-estimate our preferred specification. Figure 3 reports the value of the estimated coefficient of
the PDSI at the 10% confidence interval (grey area). The coefficient of the PDSI is positive and
significant as long as the threshold is higher than 1000 deaths.11 The coefficient of the PDSI is
11It becomes non-significant for thresholds higher than 50,000 deaths per year, but considers only 2 observations
of civil war.
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positive for thresholds between 25 and 999 (battle deaths each year), but not significant in most
cases. Drought has a positive and robust effect on civil war as long as the battle-death threshold
is at least 1,000.
Figure 3: Drought Effect and Intensity
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Another usual index of civil war is onset (or outbreak) of civil war. It is set at 1 for the first
year of civil war, set to missing for the subsequent civil war years, and at 0 for peace years.
Table 3 presents our results. The four columns correspond to the specifications used to find
the estimates in Table 1 column (3) and Table 2, columns (1)-(2) and (3) (respectively) where
the index of civil war incidence is replaced by the onset of civil war index. Our results are
qualitatively unaffected.
We test also for whether exploiting the Correlates Of War (COW) database rather than the
UCDP/PRIO database affects our results. We find our results hold if we estimate our preferred
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Table 3: Drought and Civil War Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
War (PRIO) Internal & Internal & Internationalized Internal
Internationalized Internationalized
Time Sample 1945-2005 After Inde. After Inde. After Inde.
Drought (PDSI) 0.125 0.330** -0.00224 0.236*
(0.107) (0.151) (0.100) (0.141)
Country Fixed Effect: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Time
Trends : Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,157 1,500 1,573 1,532
R-squared 0.085 0.131 0.094 0.103
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
OLS regressions
specification and that is robust to a change in the timescale (see Table 7 and Figure 6 in Ap-
pendix B).
So far, we have included country fixed effects and trends in our estimates, but not any other
control variables. This prudent strategy gives us confidence that our estimates do not suffer
from any endogeneity bias. However, country fixed effects and trends cannot control for all the
underlying causes of civil war. Table 4 shows the results when variables that are commonly-
used in the political science litterature are included (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). The estimates are for the 1960-2005 period only, because of the availability
of some of the variables. However this time range is still longer than the time ranges in the
previous studies (usually in the range 1980-2000). Column (1) presents the estimates when
we include growth of GDP, population size (log of), number of peace years, democracy index
(Polity 2) and the squared democracy index (which captures non linear effects). Column (2)
presents our estimates including the incidence of civil war in the previous year, instead of peace
years. Column (3) estimates include common time trends instead of individual time trends,
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and column (4) estimates with country fixed effects replaced by several country-specific time-
invariant controls (surface of mountainous terrain (log %), a dummy for U.K. colony, a dummy
for French colony and a dummy for major oil exporter). Column (5) presents the results with
bootstrap, cluster-robust, standard errors at country level (Cameron et al., 2008). The results are
robust. Column (6) shows our estimates using a probit estimation procedure. To avoid perfect
prediction, we do not include country fixed effects and trends, hence we exclude countries with
no variations in the incidence of civil war index. The link between drought and civil war is still
significant.
3.3 Quantifications at country level
In order to get some insight into the possible consequences of future droughts, we quantify the
effect of drought on the probability of civil war at country level. We simulate the effect of
drought, keeping all else constant and quantify changes in the distribution of the probabilities
of civil war incidence for the Sub-Saharan African countries, using different scenarios. The
probabilities are computed after a probit estimation using the same specification as the one
in column (6) of Table 4. Typically, we consider variations to the probability of civil war
incidence in 2005 as a hypothetical change in the climate from a “normal” (PDSI=15) to an
“extremely dry” situation (PDSI=25). The induced variation of the average probability of civil
war incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa is large: this change from a “normal” to an “extremely
dry” climate increases the average probability of civil war incidence by approximately 60%.
This probability is 7, 5% for a “normal” climate and 12% for an “extremely dry” climate. The
analysis is conducted at country level. We simulate three different probabilities of civil war for
each country. First, we compute the predicted probability of civil war for each country in 2005
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Table 4: Drought and Civil War Incidence with controls: After independence
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War (PRIO) Internal Internal Internal Internal Internal Internal
Methodology OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS - Cluster Probit
Drought (PDSI) 0.714*** 0.369* 0.621*** 0.800*** 0.849* 7.523*
(0.256) (0.220) (0.231) (0.256) (0.517) (3.968)
Growth -0.0181 -0.0231 -0.0292 -0.0175 -0.0111 -0.408
(0.0381) (0.0321) (0.0385) (0.0397) (0.0459) (0.415)
Log Population -0.284** -0.111 -0.0570 0.0514*** 0.0220 0.201**
(0.122) (0.120) (0.0704) (0.0116) (0.0151) (0.0849)
Peace Years -0.00160*** -0.00195*** -0.00215*** -0.00346*** -0.212**
(0.000344) (0.000329) (0.000341) (0.00124) (0.0932)
Polity 2 0.318** 0.102 0.167* 0.159 -0.0454 -0.605
(0.135) (0.116) (0.0919) (0.106) (0.173) (1.440)
Polity 2 sq. -0.321** -0.111 -0.222** -0.159 -3.32e-05 0.358
(0.143) (0.120) (0.0931) (0.116) (0.184) (1.656)
Mountainous Terrain -0.00243 0.00904 0.106
(0.00675) (0.0121) (0.0705)
U.k Colony -0.113** -0.0478 0.358**
(0.0563) (0.0652) (0.175)
French Colony -0.126*** -0.124*** -1.177***
(0.0489) (0.0478) (0.337)
Oil 0.0263 -0.0154 0.00810
(0.0335) (0.0470) (0.229)
Lag Incidence 0.572***
(0.0571)
Country Fixed Effect: Yes Yes Yes - - -
Country Time
Trends : Yes Yes - Yes - -
Common Time Trends: - - Yes - - -
Observations 1,497 1,480 1,497 1,448 1,448 1,448
R-squared 0.362 0.651 0.326 0.316 0.162
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
OLS regressions, except for specification 6.
Column 5, bootstrap cluster-robust standard errors at country level.
given its individual PDSI value. Second, we compute the hypothetical probability of incidence
if PDSI is equal to 15 (a “normal” climate) and 25 (an “extremely dry” climate). The three
predicted probabilities for each country are reported in Table 6. Figure 4 shows the distribution
of Sub-Saharan African countries for each of the three predictions (see Appendix A). With a
“normal” climatic situation (PDSI = 15) the probability of civil war is lower than 50% for all
countries except Angola (61,4%) and Nigeria (58,3%). Under the conditions of an “extremely
dry” climate (PDSI=25), the distribution of countries becomes flatter with a shift to the right,
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and a hole appears around 50%. Five countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda)
have a very high estimated probability of civil war (higher than 55%) for an “extremely dry”
climate.12 Although these countries have a high probability of civil war under “normal” climate
conditions (PDSI=15), this increases by more than 30% with the change to an “extremely dry”
climate (PDSI=25). Figure 5 presents the probabilities for the nine countries with the highest
estimated probabilities of civil war, for the three scenarios (see Appendix A).
These quantifications should be interpreted with some caution since we consider only changes
to drought conditions; any changes in the other variables are left aside. However, our results
show clearly that drought has a strong positive effect on the risk of civil war.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we used a hydrological measurement of drought, the Palmer Drought Severity
Index, with values computed according to a supply and demand model of soil moisture. We
showed that drought (PDSI values) and the incidence of civil war are robustly and positively
linked for the independent Sub-Saharan African countries. It is important to note that, as dis-
cussed, our analysis is not subject to the criticisms leveled at studies that rely on rainfall and
temperature data, and we show that our results pass several sensitivity tests.
12Uganda and Sudan were experiencing civil war in 2004, but Angola and Ethiopia were not. However, there
was a civil war in Angola from 1975 to 1995 and from 1998 to 2002, and Liberia had one year of civil war in 2003.
Ethiopia experienced civil war from 1975 to 1985 and from 1987 to 1991.
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables
Table 5: Drought and Civil War Incidence: Influential Observations
(1) (2)
Sample All Countries w/o infl. obs.
Drought (PDSI) 0.719*** 0.161*
(0.264) (0.0839)
Observations 1,597 1,523
R-squared 0.445 0.600
Nb. Incidence 124 50
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respec-
tively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
OLS regressions for countries after independence.
Influential observations selected thanks to dfbeta statistics.
Figure 4: Estimated Distribution for the year 2005
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Figure 5: Country Cases
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Appendix B: Correlates of War Data
Table 7: Drought and Civil War Incidence (COW)
WAR (COW) All All After After After
Independence Independence Independence
w/o infl. obs.
Drought(PDSI) 0.653*** 0.346 1.026*** 0.857*** 0.415***
(0.215) (0.215) (0.278) (0.268) (0.125)
Country Fixed Effect: - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Time
Trends : - Yes Yes - Yes
Common Time Trend : - - - Yes -
Observations 2,257 2,257 1,597 1,597 1,519
R-squared 0.004 0.376 0.471 0.387 0.544
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
OLS regressions
Figure 6: Drought Effect with Different Time Frame (COW)
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